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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

APPELLANT'S REPLY
TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

KIM J. TANNER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Court of Appeals
No. 890521-CA

vs.
THE PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY,

Priority No. 14b
Defendant and Respondent.
Appellant Kim J. Tanner submits the following Reply to
Respondent's Brief pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals:

POINT I.
RESPONDENT HAS NEITHER ACKNOWLEDGED
NOR RESOLVED THE STATUTE'S AMBIGUITY.
Respondent Phoenix does not acknowledge the ambiguity
in U.C.A. §3lA-22-307(l)(b)(ii).

The statute refers to "$20 per

day" but does not state whether "day" means "day of disability"
or "day in which services are received."

It does not clarify

matters to simply assert:
The literal reading of this section is that a
$20 per day limit is placed on services
actually rendered or reasonably incurred that
day. (Brief of Respondent, p. 6.)
Plaintiff has acknowledged the inherent ambiguity in
the statutory language.

In arguing for the "day of disability"

interpretation, she has shown that her position is supported by

prior legislation, construction rules requiring liberal and
equitable interpretation, logical consistency with related
provisions, and the only court case squarely on point which
counsel have discovered.

POINT II.
THE QUESTIONS OF FAMILY SERVICES AND
RESTAURANT MEALS SHOULD BE RESOLVED.
In spite of the defenses set Corth in its Answer
(Record pp. 8-9), respondent Phoenix contends that "issues
concerning allowance for services by family members and
restaurant meals are moot and not properly on appeal."

(Brief of

Respondent, p. 5.)
The present appeal arises out of an action for
declaratory judgment authorized by U.C.A. 31A-2-307.

Such an

action requires only that the petitioner have a substantial
interest in the matter being interpreted.

Phoenix's interest is

undeniable.
Plaintiff Tanner has opposed Phoenix's interpretation
in the trial court (Kim Tanner's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Record pp. 10-11; Brief in Support of Kim Tanner's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Record pp. 16, 20-21.)

Her Motion for Summary

Judgment determining these issues against Phoenix was denied.
The issues are properly before this Court on appeal.
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POINT III.
NEITHER JAMISON NOR THE REVOKED
STATUTORY INTENT LANGUAGE IS IN POINT.
Respondent has sought to support its position by
reference to Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, 559
P.2d 958f 960 (Utahf 1977), and former U.C.A. §31-41-2.
Jamison dealt with issues quite different than those
presented here.

It was decided under the original version of the

No-Fault Household Services statute which provided $12 per day
whether or not expenses were actually incurred.

In Jamison, $12

per day was sought for the lost services of an injured boy.

The

court balked and essentially determined that the family could not
have reasonably incurred any expenses to replace the boy's
services.

Since no reasonable expenses were possible, the $12

per day was not payable.
The Court's concerns in Jamison were addressed by the
Legislature in Laws 1979 Chapter 1190, Section 1.

The No-Fault

Household Services statute was therein amended to provide
benefits only for "services actually rendered or expenses
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the
injured person would have performed for his household."

This

requirement of actual expenses or services makes Jamison moot.
Phoenix cites Jamison for a legislative objective "to
effectuate . . . savings in the rising costs of automobile
accident insurance."

(Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-9.)
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This

language comes from U.C.A. §31-41-2 which was repealed in Laws
1985 and not re-enacted.

It is not an objective of the present

Insurance Code, the purposes of which are set out in U.C.A.
S31A-1-102.
Phoenix asserts that "Plaintiff here seeks to recover
payments automatically" (Respondent's Brief, p. 9) with the
purpose of drawing an analogy to Jamison.
inaccurate.

This is very

Under plaintiff's interpretation, no claimant would

receive more than the value of services actually received or
expenses reasonably incurred.

POINT IV.
ADMINISTRATION IS NOT COMPLICATED BY
APPELLANT'S INTERPRETATION.
Phoenix asserts that "Plaintiff's interpretation is
cumbersome, leads to uncertainty, delay, and increased expense
and cost."

(Respondent's Brief, p. 14.)

This assertion is based

upon two basic premises: 1) a carrier might overpay claims by
anticipating a longer period of disability than actually occurs,
and 2) a $20 per day of services limit speeds processing by
relieving the carrier from the burden of scrutinizing each claim.
Neither assertion should be persuasive.
A carrier can avoid overpayment by the simple expedient
of never paying more in the aggregate than $20 times elapsed days
of disability.

Claims would first be approved as to actuality
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and reasonableness.
calculated.

Elapsed days of disability would then be

Approved claims would be paid up to an aggregate

amount of $20 per day of disability.

This is not a difficult

administrative task and can be updated monthly.
Phoenix argues that the legislature must have intended
"$20 per day of services" because this minimizes the insurer's
burden of verification.

To begin with, such an intention is not

supported by the statute or its history.

More interestingly, the

argument points out precisely why Phoenix's position is not
liberal or equitable.
The only reason "$20 per day of services" would reduce
an insurer's burden of verification is because it consistently
undercompensates insureds.

Suppose an injured housewife has a

housekeeper come once a week for six hours at $10 per hour, not
recognizing the pit allegedly dug by her legislature.

The

insurer requires name, date, hours, and pay rate then grants only
$20, secure in the knowledge that if its insured claims six hours
there were probably at least two hours actually worked.
not equity.

This is

This is not a liberal remedy for the injured.

This

is simply a ploy to reduce expenditures.

POINT V.
GULLA IS PRECISELY ON POINT.
Phoenix distinguishes Gulla v. Allstate Insurance Co. ,
180 N.J. Super. 413, 434 A.2d 1158 (1981) on the grounds that the
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New Jersey statute does not permit compensation for gratuitous
services received as opposed to expenses incurred.

This

difference allegedly increases the burden of insurers to verify
claims,

A limit of $20 per day of services supposedly reduces

this burden upon the insurer, if not the insured.
The distinction lacks a true difference.

All that is

required to convert a gratuitous service to an expense is a
request for payment.

What the party rendering service does with

the compensation is up to that party.

He or she may simply

assign the compensation to the injured person or choose to never
collect.

An insurer's verification concerns are not

substantially increased by allowing compensation for gratuitous
services.
Gulla represents the only case found by counsel in
which the exact issue presented to this Court has been ruled
upon.

The reasoning behind the New Jersey decision is sound.

A

liberal, remedial interpretation of a statute strikingly similar
to Utah's No-Fault Household Services Benefit required rejection
of

f,

$20 per day of services."

CONCLUSION
The No-Fault Household Services Benefit is undeniably
ambiguous on the issue presented to this Court.

It is only by

reference to statutory history, rules of construction, and case
law that a proper interpretation can be made.
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That ambiguity is resolved consistently by these tools.
The history of the statute shows that days of disability was the
original criteria for compensation but was later restricted to
actual expenses and services.

Liberal, equitable, and internally

consistent interpretation points again to compensation based upon
days of disability but limited to actual expenses and services.
Case law confirms the analysis a third time.
Appellant respectfully urges the Court to resolve the
ambiguity by ruling that this allowance is based upon days of
disability, not days of service.
DATED this </Q

day of January, 1990.
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER

>. iTsfnne
Attorneys Vor P
Appellant
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